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Rapid detection of outbreaks is recognized as crucial
for effective control measures and has particular relevance
with the recently increased concern about bioterrorism.
Automated analysis of electronically collected laboratory
data can result in rapid detection of widespread outbreaks
or outbreaks of pathogens with common signs and symp-
toms. In the Netherlands, an automated outbreak detection
system for all types of pathogens has been developed with-
in an existing electronic laboratory-based surveillance sys-
tem called ISIS. Features include the use of a flexible algo-
rithm for daily analysis of data and presentation of signals
on the Internet for interpretation by health professionals. By
2006, the outbreak detection system will analyze laborato-
ry-reported data on all pathogens and will cover 35% of the
Dutch population.
R
apid detection of outbreaks on a time scale compatible
with disease incubation periods is recognized as cru-
cial to maximize the effect of control measures. Most out-
breaks are rapidly detected and controlled locally.
However, outbreaks involving cases over a wider area or in
several local health jurisdictions may have only few local
cases and thus be easily missed, especially if the outbreak
has a slowly rising number of cases. Outbreaks of certain
pathogens with common signs and symptoms (e.g., gas-
troenteric disease) can also be missed. The role of nation-
al laboratory data in detecting such outbreaks has been
increasingly recognized in the last few years as modern
typing techniques give more precision on the pathogen
type and subtype, routinely unearthing outbreaks by link-
ing cases either locally, nationally, or internationally (1–4)
that otherwise would probably not be detected. In addition,
surveillance of a wide range of pathogens is essential in
identifying emerging disease threats (5,6). The increasing-
ly perceived threat of bioterrorism recently has made more
urgent the need for rapid detection of increases in labora-
tory diagnoses of common and uncommon pathogens to
complement clinician-based reporting systems. Increasing
computational power in the last 10 years has resulted in the
development of mathematical algorithms to routinely and
rapidly detect significant clusters within large amounts of
surveillance data (7–12). Automated electronic laboratory
reporting is frequently promoted to improve data quality
and timeliness of collection (13). More recently, the gener-
al availability of the Internet permits feedback to many
users, who can have continuous, simultaneous, and even
interactive access to information. The Internet allows for
immediate communication of signals of possible outbreaks
to relevant professionals for interpretation and action.
In the Netherlands, these developments have led to the
implementation of automated laboratory-based surveil-
lance system integrated with the Internet in a project
named the Infectious Disease Surveillance Information
System (ISIS). We describe the development of an auto-
mated outbreak detection system within ISIS for all labo-
ratory-reported pathogens in the Netherlands. The system
is updated daily with Web-based feedback.
Overview of National Laboratory Surveillance
In the Netherlands, >90% of the 76 microbiologic lab-
oratories are associated with public hospitals; <10% are
private laboratories not associated with hospitals. Other
than 10 notifiable infectious diseases, microbiologic labo-
ratories have no legal requirement to provide data for sur-
veillance. Since 1994, ISIS has collected anonymous pos-
itive and negative test results on more than 350 pathogens
directly from voluntarily participating laboratories on a
daily basis in a fully automated system that uses electron-
ic data interchange. The raw information is then processed
by applying a set of criteria based on the diagnosis of a
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Netherlands particular infection. Laboratory results are thus combined
into surveillance diagnoses by the removal of results of
duplicate testing of the same case by the same or a differ-
ent microbiologic technique and then classified by the type
of infection.
1 Surveillance diagnoses are then presented as
feedback on a password-protected Internet site within 24
hours. At present, information on 40 of the 350 pathogens
is presented on this site (Table) (available with password
from: URL: http://www.isis.rivm.nl). Currently, 11 labora-
tories located throughout the country are connected to
ISIS, covering 16% of the total Dutch population of 16
million. The coverage of each laboratory is calculated
from the coverage of each hospital exclusively served by
that laboratory, which in turn is calculated by a national
organization that calculates the government subsidy to
each hospital. One laboratory (the National Institute for
Public Health and the Environment [RIVM]) is also the
national reference laboratory for Salmonella, Escherichia
coli, and Mycobacterium tuberculosis, for which the cov-
erage is much higher. The coverage of the Salmonella ref-
erence laboratory, for example, is estimated to be 64% of
the national population. Since 1996, an algorithm has been
used to detect outbreaks in the surveillance data resulting
from Salmonella (sub)typing (14).
Apart from ISIS, two other systems collect laboratory
data. Fifteen regional public health laboratories provide a
weekly report of aggregated data of positive diagnoses for
nine bacterial pathogens. These same laboratories and two
other laboratories form a network of 17 virologic laborato-
ries that report weekly aggregated numbers of positive
diagnoses of 37 virologic pathogens. Four of the 15 public
health laboratories contribute data electronically to ISIS.
Design of the Outbreak Detection System
The overall objective of the system was the automated
detection of an unexpected national increase of any one
pathogen reported by laboratories in a determined period,
for feedback to all interested parties by means of the
Internet, followed by interpretation and communication to
relevant authorities for decisions on control to be taken.
The system thus comprises three components: detection of
clusters in time or unusual disease events (e.g., one case of
rabies) and signal generation; feedback of the signals on
the Internet to relevant professionals; and interpretation of signals on a weekly basis with communication to relevant
authorities.
Cluster Detection and Generation of Signals
Approach
Our approach was to design a system to detect out-
breaks that otherwise would probably be missed altogeth-
er and detect more rapidly the outbreaks that would also
probably be eventually detected by other means. We
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Table. List of 40 current surveillance diagnoses generated on 
ISIS with type of threshold
a 
Surveillance diagnosis  Threshold type 
Adenovirus infection   H 
Entamoeba histolytica,  intestinal infection  H 
E. histolytica, extraintestinal infection  H 
Campylobacter spp. infection  H 
Campylobacter jejuni infection  H 
Chlamydia trachomatis  infection  H 
Enterovirus infection  H 
Escherichia coli O157 infection  F (4) 
Giardia lamblia infection  H 
Neisseria gonorroeae infection  H 
Haemophilus influenzae,  invasive infection  H 
Hepatitis A virus infection  H 
Hepatitis B virus infection  H 
Hepatitis C virus infection  H 
Bordetella parapertussis infection  H 
B. pertussis infection  H 
Hantavirus infection  F (0) 
Listeria monocytogenes infection  H 
Malaria, Plasmodium spp. infection  H 
Malaria, P. ovale infection  H 
Malaria, P. malaria  infection  H 
Malaria, P. falciparum infection  H 
Malaria, P. vivax infection  H 
N. meningitis,  invasive infection  H 
Parainfluenza virus infection  H 
Salmonella enterica Paratyphii group A infection  H 
S. Paratyphii group B infection  H 
S. Paratyphii group C infection  H 
S. Typhi infection  F (3) 
Respiratory syncytial virus infection  F (10) 
Rhinovirus infection  F (10) 
Salmonella spp. (nontyphoid) infection  H 
S. Typhi infection  H 
Shigella spp. infection  F 
Staphylococcus aureus, invasive infection  H 
Streptococcus group A, invasive infection  H 
Streptococcus group B, invasive infection  H 
Streptococcus pneumoniae infection  H 
Yersinia spp., non-pestis  H 
Yersinia enterocolitica     H 
aISIS, Infectious Disease Surveillance Information System; H, historical 
algorithm-defined threshold; F, fixed user-defined threshold (cases/week); F(0), 
zero threshold where one case is signaled. 
1Example 1: A surveillance diagnosis for a case of respiratory syn-
cytial virus infection is a positive culture or  positive polymerase
chain reaction (PCR) or positive direct immunofluorescence or
positive enzyme immunoassay, with all positive tests on the same
case-patient within a 6-week period reported as one surveillance
diagnosis. Example 2: A surveillance diagnosis for a case of inva-
sive Haemophilus influenza infection is a positive culture from a
normally sterile site, with all positive results from the same case in
3 months considered one surveillance diagnosis.designed the system with sensitivity and timeliness as the
priority features, especially since small increases in labo-
ratory data often indicate larger communitywide out-
breaks. Sensitivity in this context would be defined as the
number of relevant outbreaks found from all relevant out-
breaks. Clearly, this distinction depends on how “relevant”
is defined. All relevant outbreaks, however, should include
those outbreaks of public health importance that are
missed by conventional means; therefore, the denominator
will always be unknown. Thus, absolute sensitivity of the
automated system will be impossible to calculate. The sys-
tem, however, can be designed to maximize sensitivity and
detect more outbreaks than other mechanisms such as clin-
ical observation, without resulting in an unmanageable
number of signals. The system was also intended to be
more timely, by detecting the same outbreaks as other
mechanisms but more quickly. The specificity of the sys-
tem was considered less important in the initial phase,
since false-positive results could be filtered out when sig-
nals were interpreted. 
We also decided that the system should be sensitive
enough to detect even one case of certain critical infectious
diseases (e.g., hantavirus infection) or unusual infections
of current interest (e.g., hepatitis E virus infection), which
might indicate an outbreak, and to detect expected season-
al increases of diseases caused by selected pathogens (e.g.,
influenza) as they occur. This design would allow for rapid
action to verify the signal and institute case-finding or put
in place certain public health measures (e.g., prompting
nursing homes to vaccinate residents against influenza).
Generation of Signals
Signals generated by the system are produced by com-
paring observed values with a predefined threshold value.
Threshold values are calculated from values expected from
historical data (for most pathogens) or are fixed, user-
defined thresholds, set by epidemiologists for detecting
seasonal increases or monitoring critical pathogens.
Algorithms Using Historical Data
Several algorithm types applied to outbreak detection
have been described in the literature, based either on
Cumulative Sums (12,15) linear regression (7), or Fourier
regression and autocorrelative models such as Box-Jenkins
(8,9). Fourier analysis and autocorrelative methods require
model building or the setting of many parameters, process-
es considered too labor-intensive for a generic algorithm
for all type of pathogens. We decided to base the ISIS sys-
tem on the algorithm currently run each week on
Salmonella data, which has been successfully detecting
outbreaks since 1998 in the Netherlands (14,16–20) but is
not automatic and requires an operator to periodically
update data. The algorithm is a simple linear regression
model, adjusted for seasonality, secular trends, and past
outbreaks in a similar manner as described by Farrington
et al. (7) and requires little parameter resetting or model
checking. Briefly, to calculate an expected total value for
the current epidemiologic week, a regression line is plotted
through the totals in the nine epidemiologic weeks cen-
tered on the same epidemiologic week in the previous 5
years. For example, to calculate an expected value for
week 20, a regression line is plotted through the values at
weeks 16–24 of the previous 5 years. 
To maximize sensitivity we decided, after preliminary
testing with Salmonella data, on two variations of the same
algorithm, using two different window periods. The first is
a 7-day total calculated daily. This variation is based on an
algorithm that calculates expected week totals of a certain
pathogen and a threshold value of 2.56 standard deviations
from the mean (equivalent to a 99% confidence interval).
A 7-day window advances day-by-day as new data enter
the system and a new 7-day observed total is calculated
daily and compared with the expected value for that epi-
demiologic week (Monday to Sunday). If the observed
total is over the threshold, a signal is generated. The sec-
ond algorithm variation is a 4-week total calculated daily.
Each week, this algorithm calculates an expected total for
the previous 4 weeks and a 99% threshold value. A4-week
window advances day-by-day and a new 4-week observed
total is compared with the expected total for the four epi-
demiologic weeks ending with the current week.
Most outbreaks would be detected in a timely manner
by the 7-day total system. However, comparison of the two
algorithms using Salmonella data has shown that small
sustained increases >1 month would be missed by a 7-day
total system, since the threshold value would not be
exceeded in any one 7-day period. Including a 4-week total
algorithm in the system produces 10% extra signals of out-
breaks with slowly increasing numbers of cases, which
otherwise would not be detected.
If the 4-week total is <5, or the 7-day total is <3, no sig-
nals are generated, even if above threshold. Though reduc-
ing sensitivity, this cutoff greatly reduces the number of
signals of sporadic cases of infrequent infections that are of
little public health significance. The system uses the date
the sample was taken for calculation of observed and
expected totals since for any one pathogen a variable delay
between date of disease onset and date of reporting of
result to ISIS is likely. In the case of an outbreak, the use
of date of reporting for surveillance would result in a lower
peak number of cases spread over a longer period (a
“smeared” epidemiologic curve), reducing the sensitivity
of the system. Using date of sampling entails retrospective
examination of data to ensure that data reported in 1 week
and plotted by date of sampling do not produce a signal in
weeks previous to reporting. The “look-back” period (i.e.,
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epidemiologic weeks. This window allows enough time for
most pathogens to be sampled, tested, and reported. New
signals of an excess of cases at time of sampling >10 weeks
previous to reporting are unlikely to signify unrecognised
outbreaks that can still be investigated and controlled.
User-Defined or Fixed Threshold
Algorithms depending on automated evaluation of his-
torical data are often unreliable in detecting seasonal
increases in pathogens whose seasonality shifts. Aflexible,
user-defined, fixed threshold was chosen to detect such
increases in selected pathogens. For instance, with present
historical data on respiratory syncytial virus, 10 positive
laboratory results in any epidemiologic week have always
indicated the beginning of the epidemic season. Thus, the
threshold for that virus is set at 10 positives in a 7-day peri-
od. Some pathogens (e.g., hantavirus) have been defined as
zero-tolerance, where one positive result is considered
worth a signal. Although such cases are often communicat-
ed faster by other means, in some of these situations the
system can be considered as a backup.
Data Used
At present, signals are generated from both the
Salmonella database (data from the national reference lab-
oratory stored in ISIS but not processed into surveillance
diagnoses and presented only internally) and the database
of 38 surveillance diagnoses (data on pathogens stored in
ISIS and processed into surveillance diagnoses for Internet
feedback). Signals are generated from the Salmonella data-
base with algorithms that use historical data and from the
surveillance diagnoses database with both user-defined
and algorithm-defined thresholds (Figure 1).
Internet Feedback of Signals
Currently, signals from the Salmonella database are
presented only on an internal RIVM site. Signals are listed
and incidence by municipality mapped. The signals gener-
ated from surveillance diagnoses, however, are available
on the Internet for all local health authorities, Ministry of
Public Health staff, and all registered microbiologists to
access. The signals are presented first in a table (Figure 2)
that displays, for each signaled pathogen, the week in
which the increase occurred (by week of sampling), the
type of algorithm used, and the epidemiologic week in
which the signal was generated.
Signals remain in this table for one epidemiologic week
after they are signaled. For each signaled pathogen, a link
can be made to a graph showing the observed and thresh-
old for the previous 2 years. Historical signals by week of
signaling are also listed on the site. Age and sex break-
down of all cases of a pathogen in the previous 4 weeks
can be compared with that of all data, allowing an idea of
which age or sex may be affected in an outbreak. Those
with access to the site can also subscribe to automatically
receive an email of a new signal.
Signal Interpretation and Action
Signals that were produced during the previous 7 days
are interpreted formally on a weekly basis in a meeting of
members of RIVM and the National Co-ordination Centre
for Communicable Disease Outbreak Management. Since
1999, this group has interpreted all signals of potential
national importance, from informal and formal sources. In
addition, the algorithm-generated signals are monitored on
a daily basis. The accessibility of the site allows input from
many other health professionals who can contact ISIS
should they have some information to help interpret any
signal. 
Every week a meeting report is written and disseminat-
ed to all 46 regional health authorities as well as to the
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Figure 1. Flow diagram showing flow and processing of laboratory
data in the Infectious Disease Surveillance Information System
(ISIS) and means by which signals generated by the ISIS data-
base and the Salmonella database are created and handled.
RIVM, National Institute for Public Health and the Environment,
Bilthoven, the Netherlands. Ministry of Health and other interested parties. The inves-
tigation and control of outbreaks within one area is the
legal responsibility of that area’s health authority. For out-
breaks that span one or more health authorities, the RIVM
coordinates and supports investigation, while RIVM and
the National Co-ordination Centre for Communicable
Disease Outbreak Management coordinate implementation
of control measures.
The early-warning system was implemented in January
2002. In early March 2002, the system signaled an increase
in diagnoses of syphilis. This increase was subsequently
found to represent a sustained outbreak of syphilis that had
begun the previous year in a large Dutch city. The outbreak
was subsequently investigated, and prevention strategies
were implemented (21) (Figures 2 and 3).
Limitations
This system is designed to complement, not replace,
any conventional methods of outbreak detection (e.g., cli-
nician-based surveillance of notifiable diseases).
Laboratory-based surveillance will be less timely and sen-
sitive than conventional methods in detecting many local
outbreaks of disease, particularly those clearly associated
with a certain setting, and in detecting many widespread
outbreaks of disease with unusual signs and symptoms
(e.g., acute flaccid paralysis in a polio outbreak). Local out-
breaks may also be more rapidly detected from local, not
national, laboratory data. In addition, though expansion is
planned, many laboratories are likely never to participate in
ISIS, limiting the coverage of the electronic system.
Analysis of large amounts of laboratory data will likely
signal many clusters of no significance, and the work gen-
erated in interpreting signals meaningfully may be over-
whelming and so mask true signals. Thoroughly evaluating
and adjusting parameters such as the minimum number
required to trigger a signal may be required to prevent this
but at a cost of losing sensitivity. Conversely, the ability to
detect clusters of commonly reported pathogens that are
not routinely subtyped (e.g., Campylobacter) will always
be limited because the signal will be likely smaller than the
variability of the large amount of data routinely submitted.
One solution to this problem is to apply the algorithm to
subsets of reduced amounts of data on common pathogens
such as data collected by a group of regional laboratories.
Future Work
Evaluation of the System
The ISIS outbreak detection system needs to be evalu-
ated to demonstrate a clear advantage over conventional
means for detecting outbreaks of infection of all types of
pathogens, not just salmonellae (for which the algorithm
has already proved its usefulness). The sensitivity and
timeliness of algorithms in other outbreak detection sys-
tems relative to a variety of standards such as formal
records of investigated outbreaks or informal epidemio-
logic judgment, have been assessed retrospectively
(11,12). However, no records of investigated outbreaks in
the Netherlands exist, and the minutes from the signals
meeting have only recently been put in a format that
allows easy interpretation of signal outcome. In addition,
retrospective analysis does not allow evaluation of the
extra sensitivity nor of the specificity of an algorithm. This
limitation exists because any signals from historical data
produced by the algorithm, and not detected by other
means, are classified as false positives, when many may
have been genuine. Nonetheless, some idea of the value of
the algorithm is given by the fact that since 1998, no
national outbreak of Salmonella has been detected by
means other than by the Salmonella outbreak detection
system. Additionally, the feedback on the Internet and
comments from the public health community are impor-
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Figure 2. View of Web page listing
surveillance diagnoses (“onderw-
erp”) flagged on week 9 of 2002.
The asterisks in the columns
labeled “verheffingsweek” indicate
the week of sampling when the
number of a particular surveil-
lance diagnosis exceeded the
threshold defined by a historical
algorithm (“historische drempel”).
The surveillance diagnosis for
syphilis (“syphilis, vroege”) is
flagged at the end of 2001 (weeks
51 and 52) and 2002 (weeks 4–9).tant factors that affect the sensitivity, specificity, and time-
liness of the whole system since they will impact the even-
tual interpretation of a signal.
ISIS will, therefore, be evaluated prospectively at the
weekly signal meeting, comparing signals detected by the
algorithm to signals detected by other means. This com-
parison will allow assessment of the following: 1) how
many signals detected by the algorithm are not of public
health interest, as decided in the weekly meeting (a meas-
ure of specificity), and 2) the number of relevant signals
detected by other means that should have been detected by
the algorithm (a measure of relative sensitivity and timeli-
ness). Assessing the number of outbreaks that the algo-
rithm detects that would not have been detected otherwise
will not be possible, since once a signal is detected by
algorithm it can never be known with certainty that it
would not have been detected later by other means.
However, if the first detection of a signal is by algorithm,
this will give some measure of timeliness of the system.
Expansion
At present, 40 surveillance diagnoses in ISIS are avail-
able for use in the automated outbreak detection system.
Much incoming data are as yet not formatted for daily sig-
nal generation and feedback as described. Apriority, there-
fore, is to adapt the system to directly analyze raw data
(those not processed as surveillance diagnoses) on the
other 300 pathogens currently collected, and, in particular,
to make the current Salmonella outbreak detection system
part of the automated ISIS. By 2004, a total of 25 labora-
tories are scheduled to be connected, increasing the cover-
age of the system for all pathogens to at least 35% of the
Dutch population. We also hope that regional health
authorities will eventually have access to their own Web
page, presenting the results of applying the algorithms to
their data. This improvement would allow smaller region-
al outbreaks of common pathogens to be detected. 
Conclusion
We describe an automated outbreak detection system
that uses laboratory data electronically collected in the
Netherlands by ISIS. The system assesses data as soon as
they are made available and disseminates the information
by means of the Internet to all involved health profession-
als to help in the rapid interpretation and subsequent action
to control any suspected outbreak. Much still needs to be
done, and efforts are now concentrated on increasing the
data available to ISIS, system evaluation, and subsequent
modifications, with the aim of having a flexible, automat-
ed outbreak detection system for all laboratory-reported
pathogens in the Netherlands by 2006.
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